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Abstract
We examine a specific security problem in wireless body
area networks (WBANs), what we call the one body authenti-
cation problem. That is, how can we ensure that the wireless
sensors in a WBAN are collecting data about one individual
and not several individuals. We explore existing solutions to
this problem and provide some analysis why these solutions
are inadequate. Finally, we provide some direction towards a
promising solution to the problem and how it can be used to
create a usably secure WBAN.
1 Introduction
As the population of the world grows, it will become in-
creasingly necessary to use technology to monitor, diagnose,
and treat populations. We imagine, for example, that WBANs
will become the dominant means of collecting longitudinal
health-related data, which will enable physicians to make bet-
ter medical decisions. By their very nature, WBANs also
present unique security and privacy challenges. If we ex-
pect WBANs to become a solution to monitoring the world’s
aging population, then it is imperative that we are mindful
of their security and privacy implications. Many researchers
have noted that WBANs are energy scarce, and, in doing so,
have made significant steps towards developing energy-aware
security solutions where the overhead of security is minimal
if not nil [4, 8]. Furthermore, we must also remind ourselves
that secure solutions should be usable, because the target pop-
ulation for these kind of systems is often the elderly.
2 One body authentication problem
Although one can find many security related problems in
WBANs, we focus on one particular problem. In WBANs
there are typically multiple wireless sensors collecting data
about a particular user and transmitting this data to a par-
ticular base station. One can easily imagine cryptographic
schemes to pair wireless sensors with a base station such that
all communication is confidential and the sensor data’s in-
tegrity is preserved. Even with these security precautions,
there is an assumption that the wireless sensors are all at-
tached to the same human body. An even stronger assumption
is that the wireless sensors are attached to a particular human
body. Collectively, we call this the one body authentication
problem, the latter being the strong version and the former
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being the weak version. For now, we set aside the strong ver-
sion and focus on the weak version. We limit ourselves to
the weak version because we treat the user not as malicious
adversary but a forgetful one. That is, a user might forget to
re-pair a wireless sensor already paired with another user, or
they might accidentally swap wireless sensors.
This problem matters for at least one important reason. If
we expect physicians to make decisions about health data col-
lected from WBANs, then they are going to need some con-
fidence that all the data they are examining has come, at the
very least, from the same body. It is risky to make medical
decisions without said confidence, and until such measures
are in place, physicians should be wary of using data from
WBANs.
3 Solutions and shortcomings
In the following sections we present some existing solu-
tions and their shortcomings.
Low-tech
A simple solution is to put labels on the wireless sensors
to indicate with which user they are logically paired. While
this does provide some confidence to the user that they are
wearing the correct wireless sensors, it does not provide the
physician with the same confidence. Thus, we require a kind
of proof that confirms the wireless sensors were attached to
the same body.
Wireless localization
Another simple solution is to provide some means of local-
izing the wireless sensors to make sure they are within bodily
distances. This fails for several reasons. First, it does not pro-
vide a proof as we required above. One might argue the base
station could be a trusted entity to do such a localization ra-
dio traffic. However, users might not always be near the base
station and the data collected away from the base station (the
wireless sensors, for example, might store collected data and
transmit when it range) would have no proof. Second, this
trivially fails when users are close together because of the
granularity of wireless localization. Finally, depending upon
the frequency at which the wireless sensors communicate, the
body may block all or some of the wireless signal necessary
for the localization scheme.
Body-coupled communication
Prior work has explored the use of body-coupled com-
munication is means for transmitting sensor data [2]. Body-
coupled communication is means of transmitting data by way
of the physical human body. Although this is a promising
solution, the security of these types of communications is
wholly unexplored. What happens, for example, if two users
touch each other? The security properties of these kinds of
communication channels are not well understood, and until
they are we should be wary of their use.
Data-based authentication
Previous work has shown an approach for securing com-
munications using biometrics extracted from the data of wire-
less sensors [3]. That is, a combination of biometrics can be
used to seed a random number generator, which then can be
used to derive keys. This is a promising solution because it
sidesteps the problems mentioned above and it also provides
a kind of proof (the derived key). Ignoring the problem of
the amount of randomness in the chosen biometric data, this
solution, and similar ones, fail for a simple reason: any so-
lution that uses the data from the wireless sensors must find
ways of correlating the data coming from each sensor. While
it might be possible to find such correlations, it is impossi-
ble to know a priori which type of wireless sensors will be
present on the body. If we expect WBANs to have heteroge-
nous sensor types, then this problem is even more difficult.
Finally, it is questionable whether every sensor can produce a
biometric. For such sensors, it will be necessary to physically
couple them with a sensor that can produce a biometric.
4 Proposed solution
In proposing a solution, we must remind ourselves of the
requirements and potential shortcomings. Our first require-
ment is that the proposed solution should be energy-aware.
That is, we should try to do as little sensing, computation, and
transmission as necessary to accomplish the solution. Our
second requirement is that we should be able to provide some
proof to a physician that the data is indeed coming from the
same body. Because physicians will make medical decisions
based on the data collected from the WBAN, they need to
have some confidence that the data is collected from the same
user.
Our proposed solution takes a data-based authentication
approach, but with a clever modification to the sensors. The
typical problem with data-based approaches is that it is im-
possible to know a priori which wireless sensors the user will
be carrying. However, we make the assumption that each
wireless sensor will be coupled with an accelerometer. We
choose an accelerometer for several reasons. They are small,
cheap, require little energy to power, and, unlike some sen-
sors, they can be placed anywhere on the body. Additionally,
previous research has shown accelerometers to be effective
for activity recognition [1], recognizing on-body positions of
wearable wireless sensors [5], as a means for authentication
[7], and even for a restricted version of the problem presented
[6].
Prior work has proven a technique that can accurately de-
tect when two devices are carried at the same position on the
same body while a user is walking [6]. The solution uses co-
herence, a measure of how related two signals are in the fre-
quency domain, to achieve 100% accuracy. They do provide
some figures for accelerometers carried on different positions
on the body (pocket/wrist) and show that they can achieve
70% success rate with the technique. Our own improved tech-
nique for locations for pocket/wrist and wrist/wrist locations
achieves accuracies of 90%. However, it remains to be seen if
any technique can be applied for the extreme positions on the
body. One can easily imagine users wearing wireless sensors
on their ankles, knees, waist, wrists, elbows, torso and head.
Being able to show some correlation in acceleration for the
extreme examples is an open research problem.
5 Conclusion
While we have explored only one specific problem, we be-
lieve solutions can be applied towards usably secure WBANs.
In a usably secure WBAN, users would just fasten sensors to
their body and the WBAN would secure itself with no human
intervention. The sensors, for example, would determine they
are collectively placed on the same body. Next, they would
extract key material to secure communication channels. Fi-
nally, one or more of the sensors could identify the user using
biometrics so the data can be tagged appropriately. Ideally,
such a complete solution would work on a diverse population
since the user is out of the loop, and, as a result, would drive
the adoption of WBANs as a solution to helping monitor the
health of the world’s aging population.
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